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LEGAL POSITIVISM AS LEGAL INFORMATION
Frederick Schauerf & Virginiaj.Wisett

INTRODUCTION

Legal positivism refuses to go away. Condemned as morally pernicious' and dismissed as philosophically confused,2 legal positivism
has spent the past fifty years as the repository for a panoply of alleged
jurisprudential sins. While some see it as the product of self-deception,3 others insist that legal positivism provides a descriptively inaccurate and normatively unappealing portrait of the legal systems with
which we are most familiar.4 Still others charge legal positivism with
laughable pretensions of objectivity5 and reprehensible blindness to
legal iniquity.6 And through all of this, one senses the most telling
complaint of all-that legal positivism and the disputes within which it
t Frank Stanton Professor of the First Amendment and Academic Dean,John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
tt Lecturer on Law for Legal Research, Harvard Law School.
This Article was prepared for the Cornell Law Review Symposium, The Nature and
Sources, Formaland Informal, ofLaw, March 1-2, 1997. Earlier versions have been presented
at faculty workshops at the Boston College Law School, the Harvard Law School, the University of Minnesota Law School, the Seton Hall University School of Law, and the University of Virginia School of Law, where audience comments were of great assistance. In
addition, Brian Bix, Cary Coglianese, Duncan Kennedy, John Monahan, and Todd Rakoff
provided incisive and helpful written comments on a draft of the article.
1
See, e.g., ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 175 (1975); DAVID DYZENHAUS, HARD CASES INWICKED LEGAL SYSTEMS: SOUTH AFRICAN
LAW IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY at ix (1991); LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN
QUEST OF ITSELF 128-40 (1940); John Dugard, TheJudicialProcess,Positivism and Civil Liberty,
88 S.AFR. LJ. 181, 187 (1971); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law--A Reply to
ProfessorHart, 71 HARV. L. REv. 630, 657-59 (1958). A careful overview of such claims is
MarkJ. Osiel, Dialogue With Dictators:JudicialResistance in Argentina and Brazi4 20 L. & Soc.
INQUIRY 481, 491-500 (1995).

2

We take this to be one of the running themes of MORTON J. HORwrrZ, THE TRANS1870-1960 (1992). In particular, Horwitz explicitly takes

FORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw:

positivism (in its legal and non-legal versions) to presuppose a rigid fact-value distinction,

id. at 183-85, and takes the fact-value distinction to be virtually indefensible. Id. at vii-viii.
3 See, e.g., JOHN DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 366402 (1978);James Boyle, Thomas Hobbes and the Invented Tradition ofPositivism: Reflections on
Language, Power, and Essentialism, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 383, 385-88 (1987); see also Etienne
Mureinik, Law and Morality in South Africa, 105 S.AFR. L.J. 457, 458 (1988) (arguing that
positivism is a delusion because "a legal system is itself a morality").
4 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 33-43 (1986); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14-130 (1977) [hereinafter DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY].
5

See HORwITZ, supra note 2, at viii.

6 See supra note 1; see also Edward L.Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis ofInstitutions, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1393, 1397 (1996) (describing
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is a combatant are irrelevant to the issues that concern us today. The
debates between positivism and natural law, or between positivism and
anything else, it is said, are the preoccupation of a small group of
philosophically obsessed but socially unaware jurisprudes, many of
whom are English and most of whom are dead.
Yet in the face of this opprobrium, legal positivism persists. Unlike Scandinavian Realism, 7 historicism, 8 and numerous other legal
theories surviving only in the museums ofjurisprudential archaeology,
legal positivism is still with us. Indeed, it was described not long ago
as undergoing something of a renaissance, 9 and Frank Michelman has
still more recently asserted that everyone these days is a positivist.10
Yet even if it is an overstatement to maintain that legal positivism has
moved from irrelevance to ascendancy in the space ofjust a few years,
at the very least, it appears that the announcements of legal positivism's resounding defeat were premature and that even those who continue to reject legal positivism find it increasingly necessary to address
its claims."
So what is going on here? Our claim is that legal positivism's persistence is a function of the way in which legal positivism is the only
account of the nature of law that attempts to explain the features that
lead us to think of law itself as a socially important and analytically
useful category. Law schools do different things from public policy
schools, let alone business schools and medical schools; what goes on
in a court is different from what goes on in a legislature; bar examinations test a knowledge more specialized than that tested by various
standardized aptitude examinations; bar associations mark a socially
differentiated culture of lawyers; and a remarkably high percentage of
the information on which lawyers claim to rely could, until recently,
be found in the comparatively small number of volumes published by
the legal process perspective as "rescuing judicial action from the moral aridity of
positivism").
7 See, e.g., AXEL HAGERSTR6M, INQUIRIES INTO THE NATURE OF LAW AND MORALS (C.D.
Broad trans., Karl Olivecrona ed., 1953); A. VILHELM LUNDSTEDT, LEGAL THINKING RMSED
(1956); KARL OLIECRONA, LAw AS FACT (1939); ALF Ross, ON LAW AND JUSTICE (1959).
8 See F.C. VON SAVIGNY, ON THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR LEGISLATION ANDJURISPRUDENCE (A. Hayward trans., 2d ed. 1831). On the "historical school" more generally, see
R.W.M. DIAS,JURISPRUDENCE 375-87 (5th ed. 1985) (describing the origins, tenets, and central figures of historicism).
9 See Gregory C. Keating, Fidelity to Pre-existingLaw and the Legitimacy ofLegal Decision,
69 NO=R DAME L. REV. 1, 12 n.22 (1993); see also AnthonyJ. Sebok, MisunderstandingPositivim, 93 MICH. L. Rxv. 2054 (1995) (setting out a "historical account of the evolution of
legal positivism" and seeking to disprove "a set of bad arguments against positivism").
1O Frank I. Michelman, ThirteenEasy Pieces, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1297, 1298 (1995) (book
review) ("[W]e are all to some degree positivists now.").
11 A good recent example is Richard A. Posner, PragmaticAdjudication, 18 CAmDozo L.
REV. 1 (1996). Posner's reference to "[t]he plodding positivist," id. at 7, provides further
support for our sociological claims about the esteem in which positivism is held in the
American legal academy.
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the West Publishing Company. Alone among legal theories, legal positivism seeks to explain how this differentiation has come to be the
case, what our world would look like if it were not, and the extent to
which such surface differentiation reflects important underlying
differences.
Our goal here is not only to explain and defend the conception
of legal positivism we have just announced, but also to expose the dependence of this and most other plausible forms of legal positivism
on empirical propositions about the nature of legal information. As
claims about the distinctive character of legal reasoning appear increasingly implausible-"thinking like a lawyer" is a phrase heard less
and less these days except in the welcoming speeches of law school
deans-one of the strongest candidates for the feature that explains
law's differentiation is the information set on which legal argumentation and legal decisionmaking relies. Insofar as this information set is
structurally differentiated and extensionally divergent from the information set used by other public decisionmakers, the central claim of
legal positivism will emerge as both important and true. And to the
extent that the information set lawyers and legal officials use overlaps
the information set so-called nonlegal decisionmakers employ, differentiation is lessened, and the most important claim of legal positivism
12
becomes commensurately less true.
Under the conception of legal positivism we shall develop and
defend, therefore, the truth or falsity of legal positivism has as its most
substantial component a claim that is more empirical than conceptual. As one that is contingent and empirical, however, this claim is
susceptible to being false at one time and place, even though true at
others. This, we shall argue, is the most important consequence of
the contemporary transformation in the nature of legal information.
As numerous technological, economic, and institutional developments make lawyers' use of so-called "nonlegal" sources more and
more prevalent, the informational line between law and nonlaw becomes increasingly tenuous.' 3 As recently as 1970, for example, the
overwhelming bulk of the information that lawyers consulted was published by three companies-the West Publishing Company, the
12 Although our focus in this article is the law, much that we say would be consistent
with a larger claim that the differentiation of a society's decisionmaking institutions, see
NiIUAs LUHMANN, THE DIFFERENIATION OF SocIETY 229-54 (1982), is, in general, closely
related to the differentiation of the information sets on which different groups of decisionmakers rely.
13 As we discuss below, it is also possible that the informational differentiation we
believe to be waning is itself a comparatively recent phenomenon. The rise of the national
reporter system in the latter part of the nineteenth century made lawyers' overwhelming
reliance on a small number of materials much easier, and the world of the law before the
reporter system resembled in intriguing ways the post-reporter world that is our primary
concern here.
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Michie Company, and the Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Company-for whom law publishing in the narrowest sense was their exclusive business. 14 Twenty-five years later, each is part of a publishing
conglomerate for whom law publishing is merely one component of a
much larger informational enterprise. Relatedly, the ability to locate
so-called nonlegal information has been transformed, again in the
space of but a few decades, from being dependent on the ability and
inclination to move physically to a different library in a different
building to the dramatically less burdensome ability to enter the name
of a different library, while moving nothing but the fingers, for the
very same on-line search. Insofar as these and similar developments
exert pressure on the informational line between law and nonlaw, the
dominance within law of a narrow set of sources is dissipating. And if
we are correct in maintaining that this informational line is central to
explaining the distinctiveness of law itself, then the consequence is
that structural changes in the character of legal information are not
just changing the nature of the information available to the law, but
rather are changing the very nature of law itself. Although the claims
of legal positivism are increasingly important, it may turn out, ironically, that the descriptive and explanatory claims of legal positivism
are at the same time increasingly false.
I
Two CONCEPTS OF POSITIVISM
So what is legal positivism, and what does it claim? A survey of
the various forms that legal positivism is alleged to take could fill a
book in itself,15 but two of these forms are most important. We explain them here primarily by showing that the difference between
them provides the foundation for our defense of the importance of
the second of these forms.
A. Positivism and Natural Law
Historically, positivism has thrived in contraposition to natural
law, so to understand the provenance of positivism we must understand the claims to which it has stood opposed. Now natural law itself
is hardly unambiguous in the claims it makes, an ambiguity exacer14 For purposes of this introduction only, we ignore the United States Government
Printing Office and its state equivalents.
15
In 1968, Robert Summers identified twelve different positions commonly labelled

as "legal positivism," leading him to conclude that "[i]t would be best, in legal philosophy
anyhow, to drop the term 'positivist', for it is now radically ambiguous and dominantly
pejorative." ROBERT S. SUMMERS, Legal Philosophy Today-An Introduction, in ESSAYS IN LEGAL
PHiLOSOPHY 1, 15-16 (1968). This proposition was echoed more recently in Kent Greenawalt, Too Thin and Too Rich: DistinguishingFeatures of Legal Positivism, in THE AUTONOMY OF
LAw: ESSAYS ON LEGAL PosrrsM 1, 24 (Robert P. George ed., 1996).
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bated by the fact that natural law is often understood simply as an
account of the ontology of morality, and largely unconcerned with
explaining the character of law in a narrower sense. For many theorists, "natural law" is a useful label for the cluster of objectivist
metaethical claims often marching under the banner of "moral realism." 16 Natural law in this sense draws its name from the noncontin-

gent and lawlike moral imperatives it describes, but makes few
assertions about the character of the social institutions we think of as
the legal system.
When understood as an account of the nature of law, however,
the most prevalent version of natural law is a claim about the existence of a moral criterion as a conceptually necessary feature of law in
all possible legal systems in all possible worlds. Although the historical origins of this conception of natural law are themselves contested,
a plausible candidate for the "beginning" is Cicero's argument in De
Legibus.17 To be sure, Cicero recognizes that there are legal institutions that sometimes behave in immoral ways. Yet to call such institutions and their products law, he argues, is a mistake, for it is an a priori
feature of law, and not a contingent empirical fact about law, that it
satisfy certain criteria of substantive morality.1 8 Failing that, the institutions we might call "law" are not really law at all, bearing the same
relationship to real law that decoys bear to real ducks. To maintain
that a substantively immoral law is a law is thus to make a conceptual
mistake, and not simply an empirical one.
Although there is some debate about whether this version of natural law is fairly attached to Thomas Aquinas, 19 preeminent among
natural law theorists, there can be no debate that others have followed
in Cicero's footsteps. Saint Augustine argued that the justness of a law
was necessary for its lawness. 20 William Blackstone, in conjunction
with his claim that common-law decisionmaking was a process of lawdiscovery and not law-creation, insisted that immoral law was for that
16 Lloyd L. Weinreb, NaturalLaw and Rights, in NATURAL LAW THEORY. CONTEMPORARY
ESSAYS 278, 280 (Robert P. George ed., 1992).
17 CICERO, DE REPUBLICA DE LEGIBUS, 508-13 (Clinton Walker Keyes trans., 1928).
18 Thus, Cicero argued that "laws of personal exception," that is, laws that "penalized
particular individuals," were "unjust" and therefore not laws at all. Id. at 511, 513.
For this reason Lucius Cotta, a man of great talent and the highest wisdom,
was all the more surely correct in his opinion with reference to [Cicero's
own banishment case]-that no legal action at all had really been taken
against me.... From this he concluded that I need no law to repeal what
had never been legally enacted against me.
Id. at 513 (footnote omitted).
19
SeeJOHN FINNIs, NATURAL LAw AND NATURAL RIGHTs 25-29 (1980) (challenging the
contentions of Joseph Raz and Hans Kelsen that Aquinas and other central figures in the
natural law tradition believed that an immoral law was no law at all).
20 AuGUSTINE, ON FREE CHOICE OF THE WILL (Thomas Williams trans., Hackett Publishing Co. 1993).
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reason deficient law, awaiting to be perfected as law for the very reason of its moral deficiency. 21 And in Lon Fuller's procedural version
of natural law, 22 law was again defined, essentially and not contingently,
by those features of procedural justice that Fuller believed to be instrumentally conducive to substantive morality. Yet for all of its procedural cast, and for all of the admitted empirical contingency of
Fuller's claims about the relationship between procedural justice and
substantive justice, Fuller still maintains that certain features of what
he thinks of as morality are essential components of law, and thus
23
essential features of the very idea of law itself.
Yet the claim that morality, whether substantive or procedural, is
one of the truth conditions for legality in all possible legal systems in
all possible worlds is falsified simply by the showing that morality is
not a criterion of legality in some (possible) legal system. 24 Thus,
even if it turns out that morality is a criterion of legality in some legal
system (such as that of the United States), this fact is insufficient to
establish the conceptual and noncontingent claims that lie at the core
of natural law theory. To theorists such as Jules Coleman, 25 David Lyons,2 6 Philip Soper,2 7 and Wil Waluchow, 2 8 for example, and to their
most important forebear in this regard, Hans Kelsen, 29 legal positivism exists in its denial of this core natural law claim, and thus finds
itself defined as the claim that morality is not a necessary (or noncontingent, essential, or a priori) component of the very idea of law. To
whatever extent some (or even all existing) legal systems may have
chosen (posited) to incorporate criteria of morality into their criteria
21 According to Blackstone, "this law of nature, being coe[qu]al with mankind and
dictated by God Himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over
all the globe in all countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary
to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original." 1 WiLuAm BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARiES *41.
22 LON L. FULLER, THE MORArrv OF LAW 96-106 (William CaryJones rev. ed. 1969).
23 See id. at 33-94.
24

SeeJuLEs L. COLEMAN, MARrs, MoRALs, AND THE LAw 3-27 (1988); Jules L. Cole-

man, Rules and Social Facts, 14 HAR. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 703, 715-17 (1991).
25
26

See supra note 24.
David Lyons, Principles, Positivism, and Legal Theory, 87 YALE L.J. 415, 417 (1977)

(reviewing RONALD DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGirrs SERIOUSLY (1977)).

27 E. Philip Soper, Legal Theory and the Obligation of ajudge: The Hart/DworkinDispute,
75 MIcH. L. REv. 473, 511 (1977).

28

W.J. WALUCHOW, INCLUSIVE LEGAL PosrrrvisM 80 (1994).

29 This theme pervades much of Kelsen's writings. To Kelsen, a central feature of law
was its empowerment of legal officials to establish norms. Because the idea of law itself
does not impose a material (as opposed to formal) constraint on what norms duly empowered officials might create, it is fair to assume that Kelsen was the precursor of the view that
the (contingent) creation of an undifferentiated normative domain, if authorized under

the Grundnorm,would be compatible with a legal positivist picture of law. For one of Kelsen's last statements of the view that undergirds the foregoing, see Hans Kelsen, The Function of a Constitution (lain Stewart trans.), in EssAYS ON KELSEN 109 (Richard Tur & William
Twining eds., 1986).
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of legality, however undesirable it is that there should be immoral
laws, and however desirable it is that officials should take the correction of (or resistance to) immoral laws as part of their role, to refer to
immoral law is, under this version of legal positivism, not a conceptual
mistake. To phrase it differently, law and morality remain conceptually distinct, which is all that this version of legal positivism
maintains.
Such a conception of legal positivism might very well have been
developed for moral reasons, 30 and a common goal shared by some
modem positivists (including one of us8 1 ) is to attempt, at the concep-

tual level, to unravel the idea that there is something necessarily or
intrinsically good about law, apart from the good that some laws and
some legal systems might do or have done at certain times or places.
For those who share this (moral) goal, it is important to insist that the
concept of law not be understood as doing more moral work than is
32
historically, empirically, or logically justified.
Yet, as with any concept that rides upon its negation, this version
of legal positivism is only as important as the concept to which it
stands opposed. Consequently, the value of this picture of legal positivism depends on the plausibility of the version of natural law with
which it is juxtaposed, but it is not clear that this standard has been
satisfied. Although claims about the intrinsic desirability of law are
hardly absent from modem legal theory, one searches almost in vain
for the claim that the phrase "immoral law" is oxymoronic, or for the
conjoined claims that (a) there is a transcultural morality and that (b)
one of the components of this transcultural morality is the essential
30 See Neil MacCormick, A Moralistic CaseforA-MoralisticLaw?, 20 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 11
(1985).
31 Frederick Schauer, ConstitutionalPositivism, 25 CONN. L. REV. 797 (1993); Frederick
Schauer, Fuller'sInternal Point of View, 13 L. & PHIL 285 (1994); Frederick Schauer, Critical
Notice, 24 CAN. J. PHIL 495 (1994) (reviewing ROGER SHINER, NoRM AND NATURE: THE
MOVEMENTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT (1992)); Frederick Schauer, Positivism Through Thick
and Thin (October 10, 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
32
For a similar perspective, see DAVID LYONS, MORAL ASPECTS OF LEGAL THEORY:. EsSAYS ON LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY

(1993).

If this volume has a dominant theme, it is a lack of reverence for the law....
My sense of law's fallibility was confirmed by some knowledge of its
record. Far more often than not, law has served oppressive, unjust, inhumane social arrangements.
...
When I first encountered legal theory, I thought that the tradition

called "legal positivism" embodied a fitting lack of reverence for the law.
Id. at ix. Lyons goes on to wonder about the legal positivist tradition because parts of the
tradition have believed that there is at least a presumptive moral obligation to obey the law,
whereas other parts of the tradition have believed that moral factors should not be part of
the act of legal interpretation. Id. at x-xii. Neither, however, are essential components of
the idea that law and morality are conceptually separate. See Frederick Schauer, Rules and
the Rule of Law, 14 HAnv.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 645 (1991).
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moral goodness of law, properly so called.3 3 If legal positivism is solely
a conceptual claim about the conceptual separation of law and morality, then the virtual disappearance of the claim to which it stands opposed has made this version of legal positivism true but trivial. When
legal positivism is understood as the ability to claim the existence of
immoral human law in a nometaphorical sense, the contemporary
obviousness of this claim appears sufficient to justify the charge that
legal positivism particularly, and the natural law/positivism debate
more generally, are not worth worrying about. If this is all there is to
it, the lbgal positivists have won, and it is time for them to move on to
other endeavors.
Yet perhaps a conception of legal positivism that allows its proponents to declare victory so easily is simply too thin or too epiphenomenal to be important. For in insisting on the importance of the
conceptual separation of law and morality, most of the modem versions of legal positivism remain open to the possibility of the coextensiveness in practice of the domain of the legal with other domains of
practical reason. Now, it may be true that coextensiveness in this
sense would qualify as legal positivism if seen as a human choice
rather than a conceptual necessity. Nevertheless, an account of law
that fails to distinguish a legal system that is coextensive with the
moral system in which it exists from a legal system pervaded by immoral norms is an account that does not appear to be doing much
important work. A far more useful version of legal positivism, therefore, yet one that still retains the focus on the sources of law that is the
hallmark of legal positivism, is one that focuses precisely on the existence (or not) of coextensiveness as an important distinction among
legal systems and legal theories. The Ciceronian version of natural
law may have dropped out of the debate because of its implausibility,
but the original claim of legal positivism-that the nature of law is
contingent on human decision and not morally or conceptually necessary-remains important even after the demise of Ciceronian natural
law. This is so precisely because the positivist claim enables us to focus
on the extent to which law does (or should) partake of the differentiated character that some contemporary positivists properly insist is
conceptually compatible with the idea of law. But if few people these
days deny this conceptual compatibility, the important question becomes not whether law can exist in this differentiated fashion, but instead whether it actually does, and whether it is or would be a good
thing that it do so.
33
Insofar as there is a contemporary carrier of this torch, it is probably Michael S.
Moore. E.g., Michael S. Moore, Law as a FunctionalKind, in NATuRAL LAW THEORY. CONEMPoRARY EssAYs 188 (Robert P. George ed., 1992); Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law
Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 277 (1985).
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Positivism as Limited Domain

If law and morality are conceptually distinct, it would be open for
a society to recognize as its legal universe some set of grounds for legal
decision that is not coextensive with that society's moral universe. It is
the fact and not the logical possibility of this coextensivity-the truth
or not of the claim that law is a limited domain-that gives us our alternative, and much more important, conception of legal positivism. So
although some positivists have argued that the differentiation of nor34
mative domains is a necessary feature of all possible legal systems,
the more useful variant of the question explores not what might be
the case for all possible legal systems, but rather the extent to which
differentiation is a feature of some particular legal system.
After H.L.A. Hart, we think of the idea of differentiation in terms
of a rule of recognition, for it is the rule of recognition that makes it
possible for the legal system to recognize as valid law only a subset of
what a society might recognize as valid (in a more attenuated sense of
that term) social norms.3 5 Yet Hart's reference to "rule" is misleading,
because it suggests some set of criteria of recognition capable of formulation in rule-like, fashion. In saddling the crucial idea of social
recognition with the less plausible (in this context) feature of ruleness, Hart's way of characterizing the nature of law's provenance appears an unfaithful depiction of the facts of legal life. In the not so
distant past, for example, it was considered unacceptable for an English appellate court to cite to a living secondary authority.3 6 Coke,
Blackstone, Maitland, and Holdsworth were all acceptable and citable
sources of law, but that was not merely because they had important
things to say-it was also because they were dead. But then in 1945, in
Hannah v. Peel,37 and in 1946, in Minister of Pensions v. Chennell,38 Eng-

lish appeals courts relied on the writings of Arthur Goodhart, who was
at the time very much alive as the Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford.3 9 In doing so, the courts did not so much change a rule, except in
an attenuated sense. Rather, they engaged in a previously less acceptable form of behavior, and, in so doing, put in force a gradual series
of events that over the course of the next forty years produced a significant change in English practice.40 The development of the norm that
34

35
36

SeeJOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHoRTY OF LAw: ESSAYS ON LAw
. AND MORAL=Ty 51-52 (1979).
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 92-107 (1961).
See Union Bank v. Munster, 37 Ch. D. 51, 54 (1887); see also S.H. BAILEY & MJ.

GUNN, SMITH AND BAILEY ON THE MODERN ENGLISH LEGAL

SYSTEM 401 (1991) (explaining

that the purpose of the convention was to guard against the possibility that someone cited
as authority for a proposition of law "might change his or her mind").
37
[1945] 1 KB. 509 (Birkett, J.).
38 [1947] 1 K.B. 250 (1946) (Denning, J.).
39 Chennell [1947] 1 K.B. at 253; Hannah [1945] 1 KB. at 511.
40
See 26 HALSBURY'S LAWs OF ENGLAND 587, at 309 (4th ed. 1979).
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living commentators are citable sources of law is best seen not in rulelike terms, but in terms of a change in practices. 4 1 What Hart referred
to as a rule of recognition, therefore, is better seen as a cluster of
practices employed by legal insiders that, when taken together and
acknowledged as legitimate by the larger society within which the
legal insiders function, constitute a society's practices of legal recogni42
tion or, simply, its law.

One possibility, of course, is that, like English judicial practice
prior to recognizing the authority of Goodhart, the recognitional
practices of a legal system will refuse to recognize as law-and therefore as valid grounds for legal decision-certain sources that in other
decisionmaking domains in that society would be well accepted. That
something was done by a widely-respected former President, for example, is in many domains a good argument in its favor, but in an appellate court it would sound odd if a lawyer relied on Harry Truman as
authority. 43 Insofar as sources accepted in the larger society are less
accepted or not accepted in the legal domain, legal decisionmakers
will almost inevitably find themselves reaching decisions other than
the ones they would have reached were their sources of guidance not
so constricted. Thus, if the practices of legal recognition are other
than congruent with the practices of social recognition, legal decisionmakers will at times refuse to make use of sources that other social
decisionrmakers would feel free to use, and so will at times reach decisions other than the decisions that would be reached in other decisionmaking domains.
This idea of a limited domain of law, and thus of legal positivism
as maintaining that law exists as a limited domain, is not only our
conception of legal positivism, and the conception other legal theorists have implicitly adopted,44 but it is the conception of legal positivism adopted by legal positivism's most prominent contemporary
opponent, Ronald Dworkin. Consider, for example, Dworkin's use
41 On legal recognition as a practice rather than a rule, see Brian Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in LEGAL THEORY AND COMMON LAW 8 (William Twining ed.,

1986).
42

Implicit in the statement in the text is that law is a "practice" in the Wittgensteinian

sense. See PHILIP BOBBrrr, CONSTITUrIONAL INTERPRETATION 182-86 (1991); STANLEY FISH,
THERE'S No SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT'S A GOOD THING, Too 141-230 (1994);

Dennis M. Patterson, Law's Practice, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 575 (1990) (reviewing KARL N.
LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA (1989)). Nothing in this claim, however, is
inconsistent with the possibility (the practice) of evaluating, describing, and criticizing law
from a perspective external to law's practice. It is one thing to say that everything is a
practice, but that incontrovertible observation leaves totally open the question of the speci-

fication of the domain within which we are to identify those practices.
43
Some, we suspect, will resist this example. Yet for those who resist the example (or
any similar one), it would be worthwhile to think about whether the example would have

been resisted fifty years ago.
44 See, e.g., Posner, supranote 11.
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first of Riggs v. Palme 4 5 and then of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc. 46 Although Dworkin is unnecessarily obscure in explaining why

these cases are important to him, it is nevertheless true that the two
cases are perfectly selected to make his point.
Take Riggs. Its importance lies precisely in the fact that under the
Statute of Wills, as it existed and as New York courts interpreted it
prior to 1896, this was not a hard case, but, doctrinally, quite an easy
one. Elmer had been named as beneficiary in a properly executed
will, and the testator had died. 4 7 According to the New York version
of the Statute of Wills, Elmer was to inherit, and no existent legal rule,
whether in a case or in a statute, said otherwise, even for cases like this
in which the beneficiary had been the cause of the testator's death. 48
The case's importance, for Dworkin, thus lies in the fact that if law is
limited to the domain of legal rules set forth in statutes and cases, and
if the domain of law recognized by the rule of recognition is limited to
the legal rules found in cases and statutes, then Elmer ought to
49
inherit.
Of course Elmer did not inherit, because the New York Court of
Appeals held that even the clear indications of pedigreed legal rules
must give way to overriding legal principles.5 0 Dworkin's point, therefore, is that the "model of rules" set forth by positivism is an erroneous
account of the nature of law. 51 His point is a good one, however, if

and only if positivism is understood as explaining the nature of law in
terms of a rule of recognition that recognizes only the rules found in
cases and statutes. If positivism is committed to the idea of such a rule
of recognition, then Dworkin is correct in maintaning that the claims
of legal positivism are false.
As numerous commentators have noted, however, it is hardly inconsistent with the central claims of legal positivism that there could
be a rule of recognition that recognized as law, and recognized as
appropriate data for judicial decision, the domain of legal principles,
such as the principle of "No one shall be permitted to profit by his
own fraud" 52 that produced the result in Riggs.5 3 If the limited domain of law includes legal principles as well as the legal rules one
45
46

22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889).
161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960); see DWORKIN, TAKING

RIGHTS SERIOUSLY,

supra note 4, at 22-

45.
47
48

See Riggs, 22 N.E. at 188.

49

DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY,

50

Riggs, 22 N.E. at 190-91.

51
52

DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY,

See id. at 189-90.
supra note 4, at 23.

supranote 4, at 14-45.
Riggs, 22 N.E. at 190.
53 See, e.g., NEIL MAcCoRMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 229-74 (1978);
Richard Tur, Positivism, Principles,and Rules, in PERSPECrIVEs IN JURISPRUDENCE 42 (Elspeth
Attwooll ed., 1977).
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finds in cases and statutes, then Dworkin's understanding of positivism as limited domain may be correct, but he has not, on the basis of
Riggs alone, established that it is mistaken.
Enter Henningsen. Again, the applicable legal doctrine appeared
to make Henningsen an easy case-Henningsen signed a waiver of warranty, and, at the time he did so, the legal rules existing in NewJersey
made that waiver conclusive. 5 4 Moreover, unlike the "No one shall be
permitted to profit by his own fraud" principle that decided Riggs,
there was no legal principle that would have allowed the court to refuse to apply the "waivers of warranty are binding" rule. Still, the
court did not apply that rule, setting it aside in favor of an unconscionability/inequality of bargaining power principle that at the time had
no legal provenance in New Jersey law. 55 In doing so, the court did

something that the NewYork Court of Appeals did not do in Riggs-it
reached outside the limited domain of the law in order to set aside a
rule that existed within that domain. Henningsen, therefore, represents a much stronger challenge to the conception of law as limited
domain. For if law is a limited domain, then what the Henningsen
court did must have been illegitimate. Yet if what the Henningsen
court did was both legitimate and common, then to Dworkin this indicates that the picture of law as a limited domain is false. 56 If all socially (and not just legally) recognized principles are available to legal
decisionmakers, and are available to defeat the effect of a crisp legal
rule found in the cases, then the rule of recognition legal decisionmakers actually employ does not distinguish legal and nonlegal
materials, and the limited domain conception of the domain of the
legal, although conceptually imaginable, turns out to be empirically
false.
Now, if legal positivism is not committed to the claim of extensional divergence between the domain of law and the domain of morality, then neither Riggs nor Henningsen is sufficient to establish the
unsoundness of a positivist account of the nature of law. If all that
legal positivism claims is that it is conceptually possible for law and
morality to be distinct, then demonstrating that there is one legal system in which they are not distinct no more establishes the falsity of
legal positivism than demonstrating that there are red cars establishes
the falsity of the claim that cars are not necessarily red.
It is thus apparent that the positivism that Dworkin takes as his
target-the limited domain conception of positivism-is different
from the conception of positivism that focuses on the conceptual separation of law and morality, although the former presupposes the
54
55
56

Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 73-75 (NJ. 1960).
Id. at 95.
DWORKIN, TAING RIGHTs SERIOUSLY,

supra note 4, at 28-45.
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truth of the latter. If law and morality were not conceptually distinct,
then the domains of the two could not possibly be incongruent.
Although the limited domain conception of positivism is, in this sense,
derivative or secondary, it is the only conception that puts forward an
explanation of the socially differentiated features of law. When
viewed as a philosophical claim about the conceptual separation of
law and morality, neither legal positivism nor any of its negations offers any explanation or denial of what appears to be the political and
social distinctiveness of the legal system as we know it. If both the
existence and the nonexistence of this distinctiveness are compatible
with the conceptual version of legal positivism, and if the version of
natural law to which it stands opposed has few, if any, contemporary
proponents, then the conceptual version of legal positivism is in need
of an interesting question to which it provides an answer.
If, by contrast, we turn to the empirical version of positivism we
describe as the limited domain thesis, or the differentiation thesis,
then legal positivism seeks to explain, by recourse to the central positivist idea of a rule or practice of recognition, the phenomenon of
law's seeming social, political, and normative differentiation. Now, it
may turn out that this seeming differentiation is an illusion, which is
57
what Dworkin maintains with reference to normative differentiation.
In addition, it may be that even if there is normative differentiation,
the traditional positivist explanations for it are unsatisfactory. It is still
difficult to maintain, however, that the empirical limited domain conception of positivism is irrelevant to the debates that concern us today.
For as long as legal argument at least sounds different from political
argument, as long as legal decisionmaking is structured differently
from other forms of policymaking, and as long as the training and
acculturation of lawyers diverges from that of other public decisionmakers, then the claim of law as a limited normative domain cannot easily be dismissed.
When legal positivism is seen as a claim about a limited domainas a claim about the extensional divergence of the domain of law from
other normative domains-it is somewhat misleading to think of morality as exhausting the domain of the nonlegal. Let us assume first
that morality is not just a synonym for rationality, but is instead a subset of the full set of factors, some of them nonmoral, that might be
used in making a public or private decision. If this is so, then the
negation of the claim that law is a limited domain is the claim that
legal decisionmaking looks not like moral decisionmaking, but like
the decisionmaking that takes place in other public spheres. 58 Such
57 See supra notes 44-56 and accompanying text.
58 It is tempting to think of legislation as the obvious contrast, but legislation hardly
exhausts the domain of the nonlegal, and the political context of legislation is not as pres-
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decisionmaking certainly partakes of the moral, but is not exhausted
by it, at least if we describe as "nonmoral" those empirical, political,
and implementational factors that are often lumped together under
the heading of "policy." Consequently, it is plausible to take the negation of the limited domain conception of legal positivism not as morality strictu sensu, but rather as the larger conception of policymaking
or public decisionmaking of which morality is a large but not the only
part. If it turns out, therefore, that legal decisionmaking is differentiated from this larger form of decisionmaking-if there are norms,
facts, and values that are relevant to policymaking but not relevant to
law, and vice versa-then legal positivism in the limited domain sense
will emerge as true, with the idea of the rule of recognition serving as
the philosophical explanation of what is in fact the case. Alternatively,
if it turns out, as both Melvin Eisenberg 59 and Richard Posner 60 have
argued, that there are no norms, facts, and values relevant to policymaking that are not relevant to law, then the central claim of legal
positivism will be false.
C.

Sources

It is the central and persistent claim of legal positivism that the
criteria for the existence of law-collectively, the rule of recognition-are source-based. 61 Unlike the content-based criteria supporting the claims of natural law, law to the legal positivist is a function of
62
where it comes from and not of what it says.
Having sketched two different versions of legal positivism, however, it is now possible to locate within each a claim about the nature
of legal sources. Under the first conception of positivism-positivism
as a rejection of the natural law claim about the conditions for legality
in all possible legal systems in all possible worlds-the idea of a legal
source is more figurative than literal, and largely a construct designed
ent in other nonjudicial institutions. The purest model of an unlimited domain is something like Solomonic wisdom, or the decisionmaking processes of the Islami q'a/4 each of
which may, in theory, use all of the norms then recognized in the society within which they
operate. Perhaps this model is most closely approximated not by legislatures, but by certain executive or administrative policymakers within the area of their discretion, as when,
for example, a state highway official is trying to set the speed limit on a winding rural road.
59
60

MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 14-26 (1988).
RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAw 1-29 (1995) [hereinafter POSNER, OVERCOM-

ING LAw]; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OFJURISPRUDENCE 220-28 (1991) [hereinafter
POSNER, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE].

61 This feature of positivism is stressed most prominently in the work ofJoseph Raz.
JOSEPH RAz, THE AUTHORYrY OF LAw: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALrlY (1979); JOSEPH RAZ,
THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM (1970); Joseph Raz, Legal Pfinciplesand the Limits of Law,
in RONALD DwoRuN AND CONTEMPORARYJURISPRUDENCE 73 (Marshall Cohen ed., 1983).
62
See THEODORE M. BENDIT, LAw As RULE AND PRINCIPLE: PROBLEMS OF LEGAL PHILOSoPHY 8-10 (1978); Richard Tur, CriminalLaw and Legal Theory, in LEGAL THEORY AND COM-

MON LAW, supra note 41, at 199-221.
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to capture the idea of contingent human and social choice as the essential feature of lawness. If, for example, a society were to empower
its legal decisionmakers to make decisions on the basis of their best
all-things-considered moral or policy judgments, then the social decision to so empower its decisions would be the relevant social source,
even though what emerged from that source was a domain of the legal
that was indistinguishable from a larger moral or policy domain.
Under this conception of a source, the source is at its core a decision.
By locating the source of law in a social decision about what is to
count as law rather than in source-independent and decision-independent substantive moral values, this version of legal positivism
can lay its claim both to reject a strong version of natural law and,
simultaneously, to be a source-based view of law.
Yet as we have argued, the limited domain conception of legal
positivism, the conception we believe to be uniquely capable of posing
the contemporarily important questions about the nature of law, is
one that is concerned with the question whether the domain of legal
decision is extensionally divergent from either the domain of policy
decision or the domain of moral decision. With this as the question,
however, the issue of the sources of law persists, but now in a much
more literal sense. If it is the case that legal decisionmakers are "getting" the law from a limited number of sources-books published by
the West Publishing Company, to take our running (and misleading)
caricature as an example-then the idea of law as a limited domain
will be true in the most literal of senses. If, by contrast, the domain of
sources of law turns out to be coextensive with the domain of sources
of decisionmaking generally used within a political culture, then the
empirical claims of a limited domain conception of legal positivism
will turn out to be false.
In locating this literal sense of sources within a limited domain
conception of positivism, we do not suggest, our example of books
published by the West Publishing Company notwithstanding, that the
relevant informational unit is the book, in whatever form a "book"
might take. For example, the "reporters" published by the West Publishing Company draw a clear distinction between materials issued by
courts and materials, such as the headnotes and the keynumbers, prepared by the West staff. If it turns out that only the former and not
the latter are included in the normative domain used by legal decisionmakers, then that domain will be even more limited. 63 Alterna63

Consider the following familiar boilerplate:

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337.
This language, which is appended to every Supreme Court case that goes to "full" decision,
is obviously designed to express the view that the summary is not law. But what is it to say
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tively, if it turns out that legal decisionmakers base their decisions on
materials found beyond the domain of books published by the West
Publishing Company, then the domain of the law will be even larger.
Still, the focus on sources illuminates the fact that a source-based
conception of law is necessarily informationaL In making their decisions, legal decisionmakers rely on information about the existence of
norms, and information about the existence of facts. If it turns out
that the information set upon which legal decisionmakers rely is coextensive with the information set upon which other policymakers or
decisionmakers rely, then this will tell us something of great importance about the nature of law. This discovery would not be sufficient
to establish by itself the nondifferentiation or nondistinctiveness of
law. It could be the case, after all, that legal decisionmakers, because
of their training or skills or differentiated acculturation, or because of
procedural differences in their decisionmaking mechanisms, drew different inferences from the same information set used by others, or
because of their distinctive methods of reasoning manipulated the
same information set in different ways, leading at times to different
outcomes. Yet if lawyers do not think or reason differently from
others, or if the procedures they employ make little difference to the
outcomes they reach, then the lack of extensional divergence in information sets would be sufficient to establish the essential similarity between legal and nonlegal decisionmaking. And even if lawyers do
think or reason differently from others-if they do or would process
the same information set in a different way-their use of the same
information set would be indicative of a substantial overlap between
the legal and the nonlegal. Conversely, if it turns out that legal decisionmakers rely for their information on a truncated domain of information, we will have gone a long way towards explaining, even after
the decline of claims of "thinking like a lawyer,"'64 what it is that makes
law distinct, and what it is that makes the legal positivist claims of a
limited domain of law not only highly plausible, but in fact correct.
Although the claim that law is source-defined and informationdependent is so conventional as to verge on the trite, we find it intriguing that examinations of legal information have so far been unconcerned with information as defining the boundaries of law, and,
therefore, law itself. Even those scholars who have claimed that new
that it is not law? Similar questions arise in the context of unpublished opinions for which
the issuing court prohibits subsequent citation. See generallyWilliam L. Reynolds & William
M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals: The
Price of Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 573 (1981) (presenting "an empirical assessment of the
workings of the publication plans of the eleven United States Courts of Appeals during the
1978-79 Reporting Year" and analyzing the effects of such plans).
64 Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100
HARv. L. REv. 761 (1987).
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forms of information retrieval have transformed the nature of law
turn out to be concerned almost exclusively with the categorization,
recategorization, and accessibility of legal information, as conventionally understood, and with neither the very idea of the legal, nor the
possibility that the very idea of the legal is itself an empirical claim
whose truth is both contingent and information-dependent. 65 Having
established, we believe, that, as a theoretical matter, the most useful
conception of law is a claim of limited domain, and having established
as well that the limited domain conception of law is, at least in part, an
information-dependent conception, we now want to suggest that the
central question of legal positivism has become less philosophical, and
is in important ways a testable empirical hypothesis. Actually testing
that hypothesis, however, must be left for another occasion.
II
LIMITED DOMAIN As EMPIRICAL HYPOTHEsIs: AMERICAN
LEGAL THEORY AND LAW AS AN UNLIMITED
DOMAIN

One function of the foregoing analysis, we believe, is a reorientation of the terrain of debate in contemporary legal theory. Under our
conception of what is claimed by legal positivism, legal positivism's
opponent is no longer natural law. Rather, is is the confluence of four
different strands of twentieth century American legal theory-American Legal Realism, Ronald Dworkin's attack on the idea of "settled
law," 66 Critical Legal Studies, and so-called legal pragmatism. In one
way or another, each of these perspectives seeks to deny that law is a
limited domain, and each insists that the boundaries between law and
nonlaw are either permeable or nonexistent. Under our reorientation, therefore, a central question of legal theory-perhaps the central
question of legal theory-is the question of the truth of claims about
law's differentiation. For this question, Dworkin, the pragmatists, the
Realists, and Critical Legal Studies scholars all share a concern with
challenging the differentiation of law, and thus all share a commitment to a position the denial of which is central to legal positivism.
Consider first some important strands of Legal Realism and Critical Legal Studies. Significant branches of each maintain that legal
decisionmaking is substantially congruent with decisionmaking simpliciter,and that legal justification, which attempts to make legal deci65

See, e.g., M.

ETHAN KATSH, LAW IN A DIGITAL

WORLD (1995); M. ETHAN KATSH,

THE

Berring, On Not
Throwing Out the Baby: Planningthe Future of Legal Information, 83 CAL. L. REv. 615 (1995);

ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND THE TRANSFORMATION

OF LAW

(1989); Robert

Eugene Volokh, Technology and the Future of Law, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1375 (1995) (reviewing

M.

ETHAN KATSH, LAW IN A DIGITAL WORLD (1995)).
66
See supra text accompanying notes 44-56.
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sionmaking look more different from nonlegal decisionmaking than
it in fact is, is best seen as a form of stylized and post hoc rationalization. 67 Under this account of legal decisionmaking, the inputs into
such decisionmaking are not so different from the inputs into other
forms of social or public decisionmaking, even though the official explanation of legal decisions may look different because of the social
necessity ofjustifyingjudicial and other legal decisions in terms of lawlooking sources such as cases or statutes.
This claim thus offers a twofold attack on the limited domain conception of law. First, it argues that what legal decisionmakers actually
draw on in making their decisions is little different from what other
decisionmakers draw on. Although Jerome Frank, for example, did
not offer us a psychologized account of legislative or executive decisionmaking in the way he offered such an account ofjudicial decisionmaking,68 it is plausible to assume that his account of how executives
and legislators made decisions would not have been much different
from his account of how judges made their decisions. Because Frank
believed that deep-seated psychological drives about particular decisions were the overwhelming force behind judicial decisions, it is
likely he believed much the same thing outside of the judicial realm.
Put differently, by offering an account of the motivation behind legal
decisionmaking that explicitly denied the importance of sources
unique to the legal system, he was, in effect, denying the idea of legal
decisionmaking as limited domain. Even when put in terms of policy
rather than psychological motivations, as it was by other Realists, 69 or
in terms of ideology, as is common within Critical Legal Studies, 70 the
same structural feature recurs-the claim is that the sources on which
judges actually rely, the real inputs into their decisions, are sources
not unique to the legal system.
The second prong of the Realist attack is on the description of
the available set of justificatory sources. Recognizing that social expectations require judges and other legal decisionmakers to justify
their decisions in reference to law-looking sources, the Realists and
their descendants have maintained that the stock of legal sourcescases, statutes, and the like-is sufficiently large that there exists lawlike justifications to support virtually any result reached on grounds
67 See, e.g., JEROME FRANK,LAw AND THE MODERN MIrD 3-47 (1930);Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in JudicialDecision, 14 CORNELL
L.Q. 274 (1929); Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraintin Adjudication:A CriticalPhenomenology, 36J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986); Herman Oliphant, Stare Decisis-Continued,14 A.B.A.
J. 159 (1928).
68 FRANK, supranote 67.
69

See WiulAM TWINING, KARL LLEwELLYN AND THE REAsT MOVEMENT (Univ. of Okla.

Press 1985).
70 See Kennedy, supra note 67, at 547-59.

1098

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:1080

that are not distinctively legal. The domain of legal justifications,
therefore, is essentially unlimited in terms of its substance, and thus
could provide the visible props for a domain of legal decisions that
71
largely tracks the domain of nonlegal decisions.
When recast in this way, the accounts of legal decisionmaking offered by some of the Realists and by some strands of Critical Legal
Studies are only misleadingly described as claims of indeterminacy.
More accurately, the claim is not that legal decisions can be anything
at all, which is what the word "indeterminate" appears to suggest.
Rather, it is that the determinants of legal decision are not substantially different from the determinants of other decisions, and (perhaps) that those who make legal decisions would likely reach the same
outcomes even if the technical legal doctrines were otherwise, and
even if those decisionmakers were situated in different and nonlegal
institutions.
When the Realist/Critical Legal Studies account is understood in
this way, the overlap with the Dworkinian picture of legal decisionmaking is apparent. Just as a central feature of American Legal Realism is at least a partial denial of the law/non-law distinction, so too is
Dworkin concerned, as we have seen, with challenging the view that
legal principles constitute a useful subset of the larger set of all principles that undergird a society's political institutions. If positivism is a
claim of limited domain, then what unites Dworkin, Realism, and Critical Legal Studies is their insistence on the factual falsity and normative undesirability of the limited domain account.
More recently, most versions of American legal pragmatism can
be seen as making the same claim. Richard Posner, perhaps most
prominently, has explicitly denied the understanding of law as an "autonomous discipline. '72 In addition, in his insistence on empirical investigation of hypotheses whose answers lawyers have traditionally
sought in the law reports, 7 3 he has attempted both to broaden the
methodological aspirations of lawyers, and at the same time to
broaden the range of sources within which they seek to find answers
to their questions. In this endeavor, he has numerous compatriots, 74
for a characteristic feature of modern American legal pragmatism is
that for most of its practitioners the word "legal" is little more than a
description of the arena-courts-in which certain decisions are
71 The locus classicus for this claim is Karl Llewellyn's description of the canons of
statutory construction. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the
Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950).
72 Posner, supra note 64, at 761, 766-77.
73
POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 60, at 81-108, 229-36; POSNER, PROBLEMS OF
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note

60, at 220-28.

74 See, e.g., Symposium, Positive PoliticalTheory and Law, PartI, 68 S. CAL.L. REV. 1447
(1995); Symposium, PositivePoliticalTheory and Law, PartII, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 431 (1996).
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made. What makes pragmatism pragmatic lies precisely in its unwillingness to constrict its field of vision in the service of the narrower
perspective that we describe as law as a limited domain.
In identifying a common theme among Legal Realism, Critical
Legal Studies, Dworkinian interpretivism, and American Legal Pragmatism, we do not mean to be excessively reductionist. There are important differences among these accounts, differences we do not
deny. Yet the existence of differences is not inconsistent with the existence of important similarities, one of which is especially important
for us: the denial of the legal positivist claim of law as a limited domain whose practices of recognition set boundaries not congruent
with the practices of social or political recognition more generally.
Furthermore, with the legal positivist claim understood as both a primary claim of limited domain and a secondary claim about the centrality of information sets to the primary claim, it is now possible to
state what we have at times called the differentiation thesis, and which
we will now designate as the Limited Domain hypothesis-legal decisionmakers, especially judges and the lawyers who argue before them,
draw on an information set in making their decisions that is different
from the information set upon which other policymakers or public
decisionmakers draw.
When put this way, the hypothesis is less likely to be true or false
simpliciteras it is to be more or less true. That variability is not one we
view as problematic, even though it makes it unlikely that the hypothesis will be plainly true or plainly false. Nevertheless, it does supply us
with a standard for viewing legal differentiation, and a conceptual vehicle we can use to imagine ways in which the question of differentiation-the question of law as a Limited Domain-can be tested.
III
TESTING THE LIMITED DOMAIN HYoTHEsis

As we have suggested above, the claim about law as limited domain is not necessarily informational. We can identify (at least) four
possible ways in which law might be nonsuperficially different. That
is, we see four different ways in which features of the legal system
might produce an extensionally different set of outcomes from the
the set produced for the same problems or decisions in other decisionmaking domains.
The first of these forms of differentiation is the claim of differential methods of reasoning-thinking like a lawyer. 75 One possibility is
75 For the classical view, see RUPERT CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW (3d ed. 1977);
RUPERT CROSS, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1976); see also WIuAM TWINING & DAVID
MIERS, How TO Do THINGS WITH RuLEs: A PRIMER OF INTERPRETATION 232-91 (2d ed. 1982)
(discussing the nature of reasoning in interpretation as applied to a particular case).
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that lawyers are trained to reason in a way that is different from the
way in which good reasoners in nonlaw disciplines and domains reason-for example, by relying heavily on analogy 6-and that these different methods of reasoning would produce, in some cases, different
decisions, even with use of the same information base. 77 This claimwhich we can name methodological differentiation-could (and should)
be tested empirically. Indeed, for claims such as this, experimental
methods might be especially revealing. For example, we can imagine
giving groups of lawyers and groups of nonlawyers the same problem, 78 giving them the same information on which to make a decision,
and setting the same procedures for making the decision. We could
then see whether the array of lawyers produced results different from
the array of nonlawyers, an outcome that would confirm the hypothesis that there is something about how lawyers think that justifies the
claim of law as differentiated (and thus in some sense limited) domain. Although there might be factors that would make such testing
difficult, mainly the difficulty of controlling the information that the
lawyers actually used given that they might have information in their
heads that the non-lawyers did not, we still think such a course of inquiry might be useful. Still, we do not pursue that inquiry further
here, in part because that is not our agenda, and in part because we
harbor some skepticism about the extent to which the idea of legal
reasoning is sufficiently distinct to produce much difference in outcomes, controlling for all of the other variables that might produce
79
different outcomes.
One of these other variables, the second possibility as a basis for
differentiation, is what we can call procedural differentiation. The legal
76
See EDWARD H. LEvI, AN INTRODUCrION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949); Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HIAv. L. REV. 741 (1993). It is important to note that
the claim about the distinctiveness of analogical reasoning from other forms of reasoning
might be false (if, for example, reasoning by analogy merely involved nonanalogical reasoning from extant, but unstated, premises), but that, even if true, is distinct from the
claim that lawyers are better at it, or use it more often. Thus, the most sophisticated defense of the distinctiveness of reasoning by analogy, see Scott Brewer, Exemplary ReasoningSemantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REv.
923, 925-26 (1996), does not claim that this method is unique to, or even concentrated in,

the legal system.
77
In this context, we assume that "the same information base" means both the same
facts and the same norms.
78
Ideally, we would want to hold constant every other possible difference between the
lawyer group and the non-lawyer group in order to control for differences other than differences in ways of thinking, although we acknowledge that it would be difficult to do so.
79
As stated in the text, this is not (necessarily) a skeptical claim about the effect of
formal law on an outcome, for "the effect of formal law" is ambiguous as between an informational and a methodological component. If the methods of lawyers and judges make
little difference, it is still possible that the date on which they use their undifferentiated
methods does make a difference, and that is the hypothesis that drives much of what we say
here.
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system, at least the part of a legal system that makes its decision in a
court, 0 employs a tightly-controlled decisionmaking environment in
which the method and order of presentation, the number of parties
(typically two), the style of inquiry (adversarial), and the form of decision (often formal, often written, and usually required to decide for
one side or another"'), among many other aspects of adjudication,
appear different from the procedures employed in other decisionmaking environments. It seems plausible to suppose that different
procedures might produce different outcomes in some instances, controlling for differences in information, methods of thinking, and the
like. Again, we can imagine testing this claim in an experimental setting. We could take two groups of decisionmakers, randomly selected
among the larger group in order to control for differences in training
and information, and then give the two groups the same problem and
the same information base, but set different procedures for making a
decision. Were we to conduct such an inquiry, it strikes us as hardly
implausible that the differences in procedures would produce, in
some cases, different outcomes. As with claims about methodological
differentiation, therefore, we do not dismiss the possibility that procedural differentiation would produce outcome differentiation over a
large enough set of instances. Although our primary focus on a different source of potential differentiation reflects our own interests and
our own hunches, we do not deny the likelihood that procedural differences would make some difference, assuming that we properly controlled for all other variables.
The third possibility is that differences in acculturation between
lawyers and nonlawyers might produce differences in outcomes. This
claim of cultural differentiation-ordifferential socialization-would be
the hardest to test, in part because it would be almost impossible to
distinguish cultural differentiation from the factors that might produce or be produced by that differentiation, such as different views
about procedures and different methods of thinking. So although we
do not reject the possibility of a lawyer "culture" that is different from
a nonlawyer culture, and although we encourage rather than discourage empirical investigation of the hypothesis that there is cultural differentiation and that it produces outcome differentiation in some
number of cases, we suspect that if we controlled for differences in
thinking, procedures, and information, what remained would be too
80 It is important to stress that our focus on legal differentiation is a focus on the
institutions that might be part of such a differentiated culture-lawyers, courts, judges, bar
examinations, legal publishers, and law schools-and not on institutions-Congress, for
example-that plainly make law even though they are not part of the potentially differenti-

ated culture that we call the legal system.
81 See generally Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STN. L. Rav. 633 (1995) (exploring the logic and morality of giving reasons in making legal decisions).
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thin to produce much of a difference. Again, this is bald assertion
and not empirical investigation, but the plausibility of the assertion (at
least to us) explains part of why we focus on the last of our four
possibilities.
IV
LAw AS AN INFORMATIONAL ORDER

The last possibility is informationaldifferentiation, or law as an informational order, as distinct from law as a methodological order, law as a
procedural order, and law as a cultural order. As we have stressed, the
possibility that law is substantially an informational order might explain a large amount of the idea of law as limited domain, and might
connect particularly closely with the source-based focus of legal positivism. One way of framing the question of whether, and to what extent, law is a limited domain is to focus on the question of whether the
information set upon which lawyers rely is different from the information set other decisionmakers employ. More simply, what do lawyers
and judges know?
Without testing the hypotheses of methodological differentiation,
procedural differentiation, and cultural differentiation, the nonexistence of informational differentiation could not negate the claim of
law as a limited domain, although the existence of informational differentiation could establish the existence of law as a limited domain
even if the other three hypothesized forms of differentiation turned
out to be false or inconsequential. However, because we cannot focus
on all four forms of possible differentiation simultaneously, we recognize the limitations and inconclusiveness of anything that might be
gleaned from investigation of the hypothesis of informational differentiation in isolation. Still, the results of such an investigation might
well be highly suggestive of possible conclusions, and, more importantly, changes over time in the degree of informational differentiation
might indicate changes in the nature of law and the differentiation of
the legal system regardless of the degree of differentiation-or lack
thereof-with respect to the other factors we identify. Moreover, one
strong reason for a focus on the information base of lawyers and
judges is that here, arguably more than anywhere else, we are in the
midst of dramatic changes with respect to precisely this question. One
series of subhypotheses, therefore, is (1) that rapid changes in the
technology, the economics, and the institutional structure of the delivery of legal information have wrought substantial changes in the way
in which lawyers and judges get their information; (2) that these
changes have in turn produced equally substantial changes not only in
the quantity but in the very nature of the information base-the
sources-on which legal decisionmakers rely; and (3) that these
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changes in the nature of legal sources have in turn produced commensurate changes in the nature of law itself.
Although there are numerous ways in which the hypothesis of
informational differentiation might be tested, all have their limitations, generally the limitations involved in trying to use observable
data to assess unobservables such as knowledge. Still, legal decisionmaking differs from other forms of decisionmaking in that legal decisionmakers are often expected not only to justify their decisions with
formal written opinions, but also to include within those opinions reference to the authorities on which the decisionmakers have relied.
So, even though Langdell undoubtedly overstated the case in announcing that "printed books are the ultimate sources of all legal
knowledge,"8 2 it is still likely true that the books used might provide
better evidence of what lawyers know than books used in other disciplines would provide evidence of what the practitioners in those fields
know. It is also likely true that books (and other information sources)
cited will provide better evidence, especially if we are looking at trends
and not at absolute quantities, of what sources lawyers actually use
than citations in other fields would provide evidence of what their
practitioners actually used. Although there are always risks of overstating the importance of the most readily accessible sources, the legal
traditions of public explanation may provide some route to answering
the question of whether what lawyers know and use is different from
what other decisionmakers know and use, and whether what lawyers
know and use is different from what lawyers have known and used in
the past. All of this suggests, therefore, that a careful examination of
changes in citation practice over time might be useful in examining
the possibility that the degree of law's informational differentiation is
different now from what it has been at some point in the past.
It is true, as the Realists and their successors insisted, that explicit
reliance on formal legal sources might be consistent with actual reliance on uncited nonlegal sources.8 3 So the absence of any change in
explicit citation practice might still be consistent with change in the
degree of actual reliance on nonlegal information. Moreover, the
presence of a change in explicit citation practice might not demonstrate a change in the factors that actually drove the decision. It could
be, for example, that there has been a change only in public expectations about what legal decisionmakers do, and not a change in what
they in fact do. In that case, changes in public justification practice
82

G.C. LangdeU, Speech, in HARvARD LAw SCH.

ASS'N, REPORT OF THE ORGANIZATION

AND OF THE FIRST GENERAL MEETING AT CAMBRIDGE, NOVEMBER 5, 1886, ON THE FiRsT DAY OF
THE CELEBRATION OF TiE TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF

HARVARD COLLEGE 48, 50 (1887).
83

See, e.g., FRANK, supranote 67; Hutcheson, supra note 67.
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might not say anything about changes in decisionmaking practice. Yet
despite all of this, there still might be sound reasons for focusing on
citation practice. Although it may be true that the absence of change
in citation practice would be compatible with the presence of change
in the information set on which legal decisionmakers actually rely, the
reverse is highly unlikely. That is, if there is a change in citation practice, it would be a strong signal of a change in the actual information
on which legal decisionmakers relied, because it is hard (but not impossible) to imagine legal decisionmakers going out of their way to
increase their citation of, for example, "nontraditional" sources if
those sources made no difference to their reasoning. So given our
interest in the possibility of a weakening of the law/nonlaw distinction, and given the Anti-Realist presupposition that such a distinction
has existed in the recent past, an increase in the extent of nonlegal
citation would confirm such a weakening (and to that extent disconfirm the informational differentiation hypothesis, and, less directly,
the Limited Domain hypothesis).84
The citation practices of judges, the legal decisionmakers most
likely to produce written opinions with citations, may thus be highly
illuminating in possibly disconfirming the Limited Domain hypothesis, and consequently supporting the claim of the weakening of the
law/nonlaw boundary. Even more likely to be illuminating, however,
is the citation practice of lawyers attempting to influence judges.
Judges might make their decisions for undisclosed reasons, but an undisclosed argument is unlikely to be effective. As a result, a change in
the uses of authority by lawyers, especially in their briefs, could provide even stronger documentation of a change in the argumentative
practices so constitutive of law itself. Again, therefore, a movement in
lawyers' briefs in the direction of less reliance on materials published
by the West Publishing Company and more reliance on other "nonlegal" materials would signal a change in just what it is to make a legal
argument.
84 Lurking beneath the claims we make here is a much larger range of issues about
the value of what in some fields is called "discourse analysis." Much of legal scholarshiptoo much, we believe-is devoted to the analysis of the discursive practices ofjudges, and
to a lesser extent practicing lawyers, at the expense of investigating the actual effects of
legal decisions. Still, discursive practices might be important in two ways. If we see legal

discourse as a dependent variable, we might try to determine, first, if there is a change in
this variable, and, if so, what has caused it. Our inquiry here is devoted to this question,
and to testing the hypothesis that there has been a change in the dependent variable that
is citation practice, and that technological change is one of the causes. Alternatively, we
might see legal discourse as an independent variable, and try to determine whether
changes in the nature of legal discourse have produced changes in other aspects of legal
practice. Our inquiry is not devoted to this issue, except to the extent that we speculate
that in as discourse-soaked a practice as law, changes in the discourse are highly likely to
produce changes in, among other things, the seif-understanding of practitioners as to just
what it is that they are doing.
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In using a citation analysis as one method of testing the hypothesis of changes over time in informational differentiation, it would be
necessary to employ a theoretically thin definition of "law." A useful
model here is Ruth Gavison's idea of "first stage" law, 85 by which she
means the materials that look legal in the most ordinary sense. Richard Posner's reference to "orthodox legal materials" is similar.8 6
These conceptions start with the idea of law in its most routine and
banal sense, and would then take "legal information" to include, for
example, cases, statutes, constitutional provisions, law journals (the
HarvardLaw Review and the Journalof Legal Studies, but not Philosophy
and PublicAffairs or the American Economic Review), and textbooks and
treatises that are plainly about legal doctrine (Corbin on Contracts,Prosser on Torts, Wigmore on Evidence, Loss on Securities Regulation, but not
more general books about welfare policy, child custody, or foreign
trade, even though members of the latter set would typically include
discussion of legal matters). A conception of first stage law in this
sense would also include most government documents, even those
that are not explicitly about the legal system, in part because of the
governmental source of those documents, and in part because such
government documents have traditionally been part of the collection
of larger law libraries. Similarly, and in light of related traditional understandings about constitutional and statutory interpretation, first
stage law might, for experimental purposes, include material on legislative history as well as standard sources on constitutional history.
With this sense of the legal in hand, we speculate and hypothesize, but do not here test, that there have been recent and substantial
changes in the information set upon which lawyers and judges, and
also (but less importantly) legal scholars rely. If there have been such
changes, and if nonlegal information (that is, information other than
that described in the previous paragraph) occupies an increasingly
larger subset of the set of information upon which legal professionals
rely, then it may well be that the informational aspect of the Limited
Domain hypothesis will be to that extent less true, and the idea of a
distinct realm of the legal, commensurately weakened. However, if it
turns out that nonlegal information is still a very small part of the
information set upon which legal professionals rely, then it appears
much more likely that law as a limited informational domain, and
therefore as a limited domain simpliciter, continues to exist, and that
85 Ruth Gavison, Comment: Legal Theory and the Role ofRules, 14 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
727, 740-41 (1991); see also Ruth Gavison, Comment to Ronald Dworkin, Legal Theory and
the Problem of Sense, in IssuEs IN CONTEMPORARY LEGAL PHILOSOPHY. THE INFLUENCE OF
H.L.A. HART 21 (Ruth Gavison ed., 1987) (criticizing Dworkin's "cavalier" dismissal of se-

mantic theories of law).
86

Posner, supra note 11, at 8-9.
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our conception of the legal positivist claim is not only important, but
is also true.
One strong reason to believe that the legal informational domain
is becoming increasingly less limited is the likelihood that increased
availability produces increased use, and thus, that the increased availability to lawyers and judges of nonlegal information has for that reason generated increased reliance on such nonlegal information.
These changes in availability do not appear to be significantly reflected in the hard-copy collections of either public, private, or academic law libraries, few of which have changed substantially in the
past fifty years with respect to their collections of nonlegal materials.
Our informal surveys and personal observations lead us to believe that
law libraries have broadened over the years, but only slightly. Most
larger law libraries-academic, private, and governmental-if seen
only as physical spaces containing hard-copy books and periodicals,
have somewhat more in the way of nonlaw materials than in the past,
but still remain dominated by books published by the traditional legal
publishers and by the Government Printing Office. This domination
is especially noticeable in law firm libraries and smaller court libraries,
where there appears to have been little recent change, and where the
presence of nonlegal materials remains quite small.
When we add the computer to the mix, however, the picture
changes dramatically. On-line catalogs have made full university collections, as well as the collections of other universities, far more available to the person physically standing in the law library. This
phenomenon, however, has little relevance to practicing lawyers and
judges, and it would be a mistake to emphasize it excessively. Much
more importantly, there has been a dramatic change in what is available to the typical LEXIS or WESTLAW subscriber in a law firm, a
court, or a government agency. Initially, such services merely duplicated, at least in terms of databases, although not in terms of search
engines and search strategies, what was available in the hard-copy law
library. The earliest versions of WESTLAW, for example, provided
only the databases that one could otherwise purchase in hard copy
from the West Publishing Company. This has changed dramatically
over the past ten years, however, and there has been an accelerating
increase in the availability of nonlegal sources through the traditional
legal services. These include local and national newspapers, nonlegal
periodicals, a much larger range of government documents, transcripts of television and radio programs, nonlegal academic journals,
87
and much more.
87

1995);

See LEXIS-NExIS

DIRECTORY OF ONLINE SERVICES

(Lorraine Gongla-Coppinger ed.,

ROSALIE MASSERY SANDERSON, BEYOND LEGAL INFORMATION: SEARCHING DIALOG ON
WESTLAW: A GUIDE FOR LAW STUDENTS (1993). The Winter/Spring 1996 edition of the
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This increase in the availability of nonlegal information has been
assisted by structural and economic changes in the legal information
industry. The West Publishing Company is now part of the Thomson
publishing conglomerate, which also owns the Lawyers Co-operative
Publishing Company (ALR, AmJur, etc.), Bancroft-Whitney, and RIA
(the Research Institute of America, which publishes tax materials and
which had previously acquired Prentice-Hall). Reed-Elsevier, a Dutchbased and informationally diverse publishing conglomerate, not only
owns LEXIS-NEXIS, but also Butterworth's, Michie's, and half of
Shepard's Citations. Kluwer, another Dutch-based company, has acquired the legal publishing division of Little, Brown as well as Commerce Clearing House to complement its stable of scientific,
technical, and academic publishing enterprises. Furthermore, TimesMirror, which started as the Los Angeles Times but is now much more,
includes within its portfolio of enterprises both Matthew Bender and
the remaining half of Shepard's Citations. As a consequence of these
recent mergers and acquisitions, all of the major American legal publishers are now part of enterprises with a strong financial interest in
making their own other materials, mostly nonlegal, available to lawyers and judges, and are now part of enterprises whose methods of
information delivery are likely, for reasons including, but not limited
to, the economies of scale, to put pressure on possibly economically
inefficient barriers between the legal and the nonlegal materials they
publish.
What all of this means, therefore, is that in many ways it is now
"easier" to gain access to nonlegal materials than it was even in the
recent past. Bringing up such materials on a screen is easier than
trekking over to another library, and purchasing computer access to
such materials as part of a package is easier than engaging in separate
inquiries into availability and separate contracts for such materials.
Even without the Internet, which increases by several orders of magnitude the phenomenon we identify, the computer has dramatically increased the availability and ease of accessibility of nonlegal materials.
Nor is there reason to believe that the speed of change is decreasing,
and the growing comfort of lawyers in using such materials will likely
produce further acceleration. As a consequence of all of this, it is
both demonstrable and uncontroversial that nonlegal materials are
now far more available to lawyers and judges, at virtually no increase
WESTLAW DATABASE LisT runs to 238 pages of text, not including the index, and has, for
example, 265 databases covering nonlegal newspapers and related news sources, 41
databases on public filings, and 826 databases from nonlegal magazines, newsletters, trade
publications, and news services, including such decidedly nonlegal databases as Idaho
Farmer, Footwear News, Baseball Weekly, Screen Digest, Ward's Auto World, and transcripts from Rivera Live and Eye to Eye with Connie Chung. SONDRA J.
DATABASE

LsT (Winter/Spring 1996 ed.).

LAMBERT,
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in cost (defined expansively, to include time and effort as well as monetary price) than was the case even ten years ago.
Availability, however, does not necessarily translate into use. Yet
if there has been an increase in use, it seems highly plausible to suppose that increased availability provides a large part of the causal explanation. In fact, at least based on our preliminary examination of
Supreme Court citation practices, 88 there has been a substantial
change in levels of use of nonlegal information. However, an inquiry
into availability cannot substitute for an inquiry into use, and that is
the primary purpose of our investigation of citation practices.
Although there have been some studies of court citation practices, 9
none have focused on nonlegal materials, and only one 90 has been
recent enough to make that a realistic possibility, because it is clear
that citation to nonlegal materials was virtually nonexistent for most of
the period covered by the existing studies. Yet what an analysis of
judicial opinions confirms is that the changes in recent years have
been dramatic. For the Supreme Court of the United States, we
counted (rather than sampled) citations to nonlegal materials for the
1950, 1960, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994,and
1995 Terms of the Court. This analysis, found below in the Appendix,
makes it clear that there was no significant increase in the Court's
citation of nonlegal sources from 1950 through 1990, but that, starting in 1991, there has been a substantial and continuing increase in
the Court's citation of nonlegal sources. In addition, ouri preliminary
and informal examination indicates that there appear to be similar
changes, although at lower levels and with some time lag, in the
United States Courts of Appeals, the United States District Courts, the
California Supreme Court, and the New York Court of Appeals.

88 See Appendix.
89
See, e.g., Wes Daniels, "FarBeyond the Law Reports". Secondary Source Citations in United
States Supreme Court Opinions, October Terms 1900, 1940, and 1978, 76 L. IaBR. J. 1 (1983);
Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts:A Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L.
REv. 773 (1981); William H. Manz, The Citation Practices of the New York'Court of Appeals,
1850-1993, 43 Burr. L. REv. 121 (1995); John Henry Merryman, The Authority of Authority:
What the California Supreme Court Cited in 1950, 6 STN. L. Ruv. 613 (1954); John Henry
Merryman, Toward A Theory of Citations:An EmpiricalStudy of the CitationPracticeof the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. CAL. L. Rxv. 381 (1977) [hereinafter Merryman, Toward A Theory of Citations]; William L. Reynolds, II, The Court of Appeals of
Maryland: Roles, Work and Performance, PartII: Craftsmanship and Decisionmaking, 38 MD. L.
REV. 148 (1978). According to Merryman's studies, citation to nonlegal authority was insignificant through 1970. Merryman, Toward A Theory of Citations,supra, at 405-15. California
will be one of the states analyzed, in part to build on the Merryman studies. This is consistent with the results Daniels, Friedman et al., and Manz obtained. Daniels, supra, at 18-20;
Friedman et al., supra, at 810-17; Manz, supra, at 137-46.
90 See Manz, supra note 89.
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V
THE DELEGALIZATION OF LAW

Although the rate of change in citation of nonlegal materials,
both for the Supreme Court and for the lower courts, has been much
slower than changes in availability would predict, the preliminary observation appears to confirm a larger trend towards the increasing
pervasiveness of nonlegal sources within the universe of information
that legal actors use. If this is so, then it might be seen as either a
dependent or independent variable. If seen as a dependent variable,
then we might hypothesize that changes in the use of nonlegal information have been substantially caused by increased availability, and
that the increased availability is itself the causal product of the economic, technological, and institutional changes we. have discussed
here.
If the increased use of nonlegal information is seen as an independent variable, then questions arise about what this means for
the nature and practice of law. Will it produce an even broader manifestation of the phenomenon we might call the delegalizationof law? If
so, what are the implications for the symptoms of law's autonomy, including the content of bar examinations, the curricula of law schools,
and the rhetoric of legal argument? Although there are examples in
which nonlegal information has influenced specific legal doctrines, 9 1
we suggest a broader possibility. Informational changes will likely be
insufficient to uproot centuries of law as a limited domain, but the
forces of informational integration may be sufficiently powerful, and
the nature of law sufficiently information- and source-dependent, that
changes in the nature of legal information 'will produce changes in
the nature of law. Our goal here has not been to examine the empirical dimensions of this claim, nor to forecast the future. We have tried
to recast one of the central and enduring questions of legal theory,
and to recast it in a way that provides the conceptual resources for a
serious empirical inquiry. That inquiry, however, must wait for another day.

91 See, e.g., Richard Edelin Crouch, An Essay on the Critical andJudicialReception of Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, 13 FAM. L.Q. 49, 80-101 (1979); Laurens Walker &
John Monahan, Social Facts: Scientific Methodology as Legal Precedent 76 CAL. L. REV. 877

(1988).
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U.S. Supreme Court Opinions, by Term
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92
Non-legal citations consisted of secondary materials other than cases, constitutional
provisions, legal treatises, law reviews, governmental documents, and standard compilations of legislative and constitutional history. Thus, the set of non-legal citations consists
largely of citations to history, political science, economics, and other non-legal academic
journals, to newspapers and popular periodicals, to dictionaries and encyclopedias, to
books of history, politics, and the like, and occasionally to poetry, plays, and literature.
Although the number of pages increased over the relevant period, the trend is roughly the
same if non-legal citations are measured per page rather than absolutely.
93 Most of the "spike" is explained by McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
McGowan contained 53 citations to secondary materials. Without McGowan's influence, the
number of citations to non-legal sources for this period would fall from 156 to 103.

